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Abstract
The Banzhaf power index was introduced in cooperative game theory to mea-
sure the real power of players in a game. The Banzhaf interaction index was
then proposed to measure the interaction degree inside coalitions of players.
It was shown that the power and interaction indexes can be obtained as solu-
tions of a standard least squares approximation problem for pseudo-Boolean
functions. Considering certain weighted versions of this approximation prob-
lem, we define a class of weighted interaction indexes that generalize the
Banzhaf interaction index. We show that these indexes define a subclass
of the family of probabilistic interaction indexes and study their most im-
portant properties. Finally, we give an interpretation of the Banzhaf and
Shapley interaction indexes as centers of mass of this subclass of interaction
indexes.
Keywords: Cooperative game, pseudo-Boolean function, power index,
interaction index, least squares approximation.
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1. Introduction
In cooperative game theory, various kinds of power indexes are used to
measure the influence that a given player has on the outcome of the game or
to define a way of sharing the benefits of the game among the players. The
best known power indexes are due to Shapley [21, 22] and Banzhaf [2, 8].
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However, there are many other examples of such indexes in the literature;
see for instance [1, 5, 24].
When one is concerned by the analysis of the behavior of players in a
game, the information provided by power indexes might be far insufficient,
for instance due to the lack of information on how the players interact within
the game. The notion of interaction index was then introduced to measure
an interaction degree among players in coalitions. The first proposal goes
back to Owen [18] who defined the “co-value” of a pair of players {i, j} in a
game v on N = {1, . . . , n} as an average over all coalitions S ⊆ N ∖ {i, j} of
the quantity
v(S ∪ {i, j}) − v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ∪ {j}) + v(S).1
This definition was rediscovered and interpreted as an interaction index by
Murofushi and Soneda [17]. A systematic approach was then initiated by
Grabisch [10, 11] and Roubens [20] and led to the definition of the Shap-
ley and Banzhaf interaction indexes as well as many others. For general
background, see Fujimoto et al. [9].
There is no universal power or interaction index that can be used in
every single practical situation. The choice of such an index often depends
on the problem under consideration. Several axiomatizations of power and
interaction indexes have then been proposed thus far (see [8, 21] for power
indexes and [9, 13] for interaction indexes).
In addition to being axiomatized, the Banzhaf and Shapley power indexes
were shown to be solutions of simple least squares approximation problems:
• Charnes et al. [3] considered the problem of finding the best efficient
(hence constrained) approximation of a given game by an additive game
in the sense of weighted least squares. They showed that the Shapley
power index appears as the unique solution of the approximation prob-
lem for a specified choice of the weight system over the coalitions. By
considering all the possible weights in the approximation problem, they
defined the class of weighted Shapley values.
• Hammer and Holzman [14] considered the problem of approximat-
ing a pseudo-Boolean function by another pseudo-Boolean function
1Intuitively, this quantity measures how the players i and j interact in the presence of
S. In contrast, the “coalitional power” of the pair {i, j} in the presence of S is measured
by an average value of v(S ∪ {i, j}) − v(S) (see [16]).
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of smaller degree in the sense of standard (non-weighted and non-
constrained) least squares. They showed that the Banzhaf power index
appears as the coefficients of the linear terms in the solution of the
approximation problem by functions of degree at most one. Later, this
problem was generalized by Grabisch et al. [12] who showed that the
Banzhaf interaction index appears as the leading coefficients of the best
least squares approximations by functions of specified degrees.
A natural way to generalize the non-weighted approach of Hammer and
Holzman (we recall it in Section 2) consists in adding the following weighted,
probabilistic viewpoint: A weight w(S) is assigned to every coalition S of
players and interpreted as the probability that coalition S forms.2 On this
issue, we note that the weighted least squares problem associated with the
probability distribution w was studied in Ding et al. [6, 7] in the special case
when the players behave independently of each other to form coalitions.
In Section 3 we briefly recall the setting and main results of the ap-
proximation problem considered by Ding et al. [6, 7]. We then introduce a
weighted Banzhaf interaction index associated with w by considering, as in
Hammer and Holzman’s approach, the leading coefficients of the approxima-
tions of specified degrees. We also derive explicit expressions for this index,
which allow us to generalize some of the results in [7].
In Section 4 we investigate the main properties of this new class of indexes.
For instance we prove that they define a subclass of the family of so-called
probabilistic interaction indexes introduced in Fujimoto et al. [9], we analyze
their behavior with respect to null players and dummy coalitions, and we
describe their symmetric versions.
Finally, in Section 5 we discuss interpretations of the Banzhaf and Shapley
interaction indexes as centers of mass of weighted Banzhaf interaction indexes
and we introduce an absolute interaction index associated to each weighted
Banzhaf interaction index, which allows us to compute the coefficient of
determination of the best kth approximations.
2. Interaction indexes
In this section we recall the concepts of power and interaction indexes
introduced in cooperative game theory and how the Banzhaf index can be
2This probabilistic approach was considered for instance in [3, 4, 18].
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obtained from the solution of a standard least squares approximation prob-
lem.
Recall that a (cooperative) game on a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}
is a set function v∶2N → R which assigns to each coalition S of players a real
number v(S) representing the worth of S.3 Through the usual identification
of the subsets of N with the elements of {0,1}n, a game v∶2N → R can be
equivalently described by a pseudo-Boolean function f ∶ {0,1}n → R. The
correspondence is given by v(S) = f(1S) and
f(x) = ∑
S⊆N
v(S) ∏
i∈S
xi ∏
i∈N∖S
(1 − xi). (1)
To avoid cumbersome notation, we will henceforth use the same symbol to
denote both a given pseudo-Boolean function and its underlying set function
(game), thus writing f ∶ {0,1}n → R or f ∶2N → R indifferently.
Equation (1) shows that any pseudo-Boolean function f ∶ {0,1}n → R can
always be represented by a multilinear polynomial of degree at most n (see
[15]), which can be further simplified into
f(x) = ∑
S⊆N
a(S) ∏
i∈S
xi , (2)
where the set function a∶2N → R, called theMo¨bius transform of f , is defined
by
a(S) = ∑
T⊆S
(−1)∣S∣−∣T ∣ f(T ).
Let GN denote the set of games on N . A power index [21] on N is a
function φ∶ GN ×N → R that assigns to every player i ∈ N in a game f ∈ GN
his/her prospect φ(f, i) from playing the game. An interaction index [13] on
N is a function I ∶ GN×2N → R that measures in a game f ∈ GN the interaction
degree among the players of a coalition S ⊆ N .
For instance, the Banzhaf interaction index [13] of a coalition S ⊆ N in a
game f ∈ GN is defined by
IB(f,S) = ∑
T⊇S
(1
2
)∣T ∣−∣S∣a(T )
3Usually, the condition v(∅) = 0 is required for v to define a game. However, we do not
need this restriction in the present paper.
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and the Banzhaf power index [8] of a player i ∈ N in a game f ∈ GN is defined
by φB(f, i) = IB(f,{i}).
It is noteworthy that IB(f,S) can be interpreted as an average of the
S-difference (or discrete S-derivative) ∆Sf of f . Indeed, it can be shown
(see [12, §2]) that
IB(f,S) = 1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
∆Sf(x) = 1
2n−∣S∣
∑
T⊆N∖S
(∆Sf)(T ), (3)
where ∆Sf is defined inductively by ∆∅f = f and ∆Sf = ∆{i}∆S∖{i}f for
i ∈ S, with ∆{i}f(x) = f(x ∣ xi = 1) − f(x ∣ xi = 0).
By extending formally any pseudo-Boolean function f to [0,1]n by linear
interpolation, we can define themultilinear extension of f (see Owen [18, 19]),
that is, the multilinear polynomial f¯ ∶ [0,1]n → R defined by
f¯(x) = ∑
S⊆N
f(S) ∏
i∈S
xi ∏
i∈N∖S
(1 − xi) = ∑
S⊆N
a(S) ∏
i∈S
xi .
By extending also the concept of S-difference to the multilinear polyno-
mials defined on [0,1]n, we also have the following identities (see [19])
IB(f,S) = (∆S f¯)(12) = ∫
[0,1]n
∆S f¯(x)dx, (4)
where 1
2
stands for (1
2
, . . . , 1
2
).
Since the S-difference operator ∆S has the same effect as the S-derivative
operatorDS (i.e., the partial derivative operator with respect to the variables
in S) when applied to multilinear polynomials defined on [0,1]n, we also have
IB(f,S) = (DS f¯)(12) = ∫
[0,1]n
DS f¯(x)dx. (5)
We now recall how the Banzhaf interaction index can be obtained from a
least squares approximation problem, as investigated by Hammer and Holz-
man [14] and Grabisch et al. [12]. For k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, denote by Vk the set of
all multilinear polynomials g∶{0,1}n → R of degree at most k, that is of the
form
g(x) = ∑
S⊆N
∣S∣⩽k
c(S)∏
i∈S
xi ,
where the coefficients c(S) are real numbers. For a given pseudo-Boolean
function f ∶{0,1}n → R, the best kth approximation of f is the unique mul-
tilinear polynomial fk ∈ Vk that minimizes the squared distance
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(f(x) − g(x))2 = ∑
T⊆N
(f(T ) − g(T ))2 (6)
among all functions g ∈ Vk. A closed-form expression of fk was given in [14]
for k = 1 and k = 2 and in [12] for arbitrary k ⩽ n. In fact, when f is given in
its multilinear form (2) we obtain
fk(x) = ∑
S⊆N
∣S∣⩽k
ak(S)∏
i∈S
xi, (7)
where
ak(S) = a(S) + (−1)k−∣S∣ ∑
T⊇S
∣T ∣>k
(∣T ∣ − ∣S∣ − 1
k − ∣S∣ ) (12)
∣T ∣−∣S∣
a(T ). (8)
It is then easy to see that
IB(f,S) = a∣S∣(S). (9)
Thus IB(f,S) is exactly the coefficient of the monomial ∏i∈S xi in the best
approximation of f by a multilinear polynomial of degree at most ∣S∣.
3. Weighted Banzhaf interaction indexes
The approximation problem described in the previous section uses the
standard (non-weighted) Euclidean distance (6), for which all the subsets (or
coalitions of players) are considered on the same footing. Now, suppose that
some coalitions are more important than some others, for instance because
they are more likely to form. To take these importances into consideration,
it is natural to generalize the approximation problem by considering an ap-
propriate weighted Euclidean distance. Thus modified, this approximation
problem will then allow us to define a concept of weighted Banzhaf interac-
tion index.
This weighted approximation problem was actually presented and solved
(under the independence assumption) in Ding et al. [6, 7]. We now briefly
recall the setting of this problem as well as some of the most relevant results.
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Given a weight function w∶ {0,1}n → ]0,∞[ and a pseudo-Boolean func-
tion f ∶{0,1}n → R, we define the best kth approximation of f as the unique
multilinear polynomial fk ∈ Vk that minimizes the squared distance
∑
x∈{0,1}n
w(x)(f(x) − g(x))2 = ∑
S⊆N
w(S)(f(S) − g(S))2 (10)
among all functions g ∈ Vk.
Clearly, we can assume without loss of generality that the weights w(S)
are (multiplicatively) normalized so that ∑S⊆N w(S) = 1. We then imme-
diately see that the weights define a probability distribution over 2N and
we can interpret w(S) as the probability that coalition S forms, that is,
w(S) = Pr(C = S), where C denotes a random coalition.
Now, suppose that the players behave independently of each other to form
coalitions, which means that the events (C ∋ i), for i ∈ N , are independent.
In this case, also the indicator random variables Xi = Ind(C ∋ i), for i ∈ N ,
are independent. Setting pi = Pr(C ∋ i) = ∑S∋iw(S), we then have pi =
Pr[Xi = 1] = E[Xi], 0 < pi < 1, and
w(S) =∏
i∈S
pi ∏
i∈N∖S
(1 − pi)
or, equivalently,
w(x) =∏
i∈N
pxii (1 − pi)1−xi .
Remark 1. This interpretation of w(T ) as a probability is precisely the one
proposed by Owen [19] in the interpretation of the multilinear extension of
a game as an expected value: Given a game f ∶2N → R, we have
f¯(p1, . . . , pn) = ∑
S⊆N
w(S)f(S) = E[f(C)],
where C is a random coalition.
The set Vk is clearly a linear space of dimension ∑ks=0 (ns) spanned by the
basis Bk = {uS ∶ S ⊆ N, ∣S∣ ⩽ k}, where the functions uS ∶ {0,1}n → R (called
unanimity games in game theory) are defined by uS(x) =∏i∈S xi. Note that
the distance defined in (10) is the natural L2-distance associated with the
measure w and corresponds to the weighted Euclidean inner product
⟨f, g⟩ = ∑
x∈{0,1}n
w(x)f(x)g(x).
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Thus the solution of this approximation problem exists and is uniquely de-
termined by the orthogonal projection of f onto Vk. This projection can be
easily expressed in any orthonormal basis of Vk. In this respect, it was shown
in [7] that the set B′k = {vS ∶ S ⊆ N, ∣S∣ ⩽ k}, where vS ∶ {0,1}n → R is given
by
vS(x) =∏
i∈S
xi − pi√
pi(1 − pi) = ∑T⊆S
∏i∈S∖T(−pi)
∏i∈S√pi(1 − pi) uT (x)
forms such an orthonormal basis for Vk.
The following immediate theorem gives the components of the best kth
approximation of a pseudo-Boolean function f ∶ {0,1}n → R in the basis B′k.
Theorem 1. [7, Theorem 4] The best kth approximation of f ∶ {0,1}n → R is
the function
fk = ∑
T⊆N
∣T ∣⩽k
⟨f, vT ⟩vT . (11)
By expressing the functions vT in the basis Bk, we immediately obtain
the following expression of fk in terms of the functions uS:
fk = ∑
S⊆N
∣S∣⩽k
ak(S)uS , (12)
where
ak(S) = ∑
T⊇S
∣T ∣⩽k
∏i∈T∖S(−pi)
∏i∈T √pi(1 − pi) ⟨f, vT ⟩. (13)
Let p stand for (p1, . . . , pn). By analogy with (9), in order to measure
the interaction degree among players in a game f ∶ {0,1}n → R, we naturally
define an index IB,p∶ GN × 2N → R as IB,p(f,S) = a∣S∣(S), where a∣S∣(S) is
obtained from f by (13). We will see in the next section that this index
indeed measures a power degree when ∣S∣ = 1 and an interaction degree when∣S∣ ⩾ 2.
Definition 2. Let IB,p∶ GN × 2N → R be defined as
IB,p(f,S) = ⟨f, vS⟩∏i∈S√pi(1 − pi) ,
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that is,
IB,p(f,S) = 1∏i∈S pi(1 − pi) ∑x∈{0,1}nw(x)f(x)∏i∈S(xi − pi). (14)
Clearly, formula (14) can be immediately rewritten as a sum over subsets
as follows:
IB,p(f,S) = ∑
T⊆N
(−1)∣S∖T ∣ f(T ) ∏
i∈T∖S
pi ∏
i∈N∖(T∪S)
(1 − pi). (15)
Remark 2. The definition of the index IB,p is close to that of the transforma-
tion T considered in Ding et al. [7], where the components of T (f) are defined
by αS(f) = ⟨f, vS⟩. However, our approach (which is closer to Hammer and
Holzman’s [14]) is not only equivalent to Ding et al.’s but leads to easier
interpretations and computations as will be shown in the next paragraphs.
We have defined an interaction index from an approximation (projec-
tion) problem. Conversely, this index characterizes this approximation prob-
lem. Indeed, as the following result shows, the best kth approximation of
f ∶ {0,1}n → R is the unique function of Vk that preserves the interaction in-
dex for all the s-subsets such that s ⩽ k. The non-weighted analogue of this
result was established in [12] for the Banzhaf interaction index IB.
Proposition 3. A function fk ∈ Vk is the best kth approximation of f ∶ {0,1}n →
R if and only if IB,p(f,S) = IB,p(fk, S) for all S ⊆ N such that ∣S∣ ⩽ k.
Proof. By definition, we have IB,p(f,S) = IB,p(fk, S) if and only if ⟨f −
fk, vS⟩ = 0 for all S ⊆ N such that ∣S∣ ⩽ k, and the latter condition character-
izes the projection of f onto Vk.
Since the best nth approximation of f is f itself, by (11) we immediately
see that f can be expressed in terms of IB,p as
f(x) = ∑
T⊆N
IB,p(f,T ) ∏
i∈T
(xi − pi), (16)
which shows that the map f ↦ {IB,p(f,S) ∶ S ⊆ N} is a linear bijection.
We also have the following representation result, which generalizes the
first equalities in (4) and (5).
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Proposition 4. For every f ∶ {0,1}n → R and every S ⊆ N , we have
IB,p(f,S) = (DS f¯)(p) = (∆S f¯)(p). (17)
In particular, IB,p(f,∅) = f¯(p) =∑x∈{0,1}n w(x)f(x).
Proof. The result immediately follows from comparing (16) with the Taylor
expansion of f¯ at p. The particular case was discussed in Remark 1.
Example 5. Consider the 3-person majority game defined by
f(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2 + x2x3 + x3x1 − 2x1x2x3.
By (4) and (17), we have IB(f,{i, j}) = 0 and IB,p(f,{i, j}) = 1 − 2pk, where{i, j, k} = {1,2,3}. Intuitively, if pk is close to 1, then the coalitions containing
k are most likely to form. In these coalitions, the presence of only one of the
remaining players is sufficient to form a winning coalition, thus explaining
the negative interaction between i and j. A similar conclusion can be drawn
if pk is close to 0.
Explicit conversion formulas between the interaction index and the best
approximation can be easily derived from the preceding results. On the one
hand, by (13), we have
ak(S) = ∑
T⊇S
∣T ∣⩽k
IB,p(f,T ) ∏
i∈T∖S
(−pi) , for ∣S∣ ⩽ k. (18)
On the other hand, by Propositions 3 and 4 and Equation (12), we also have
IB,p(f,S) = IB,p(fk, S) = (∆S f¯k)(p)= ∑
T⊆N
∣T ∣⩽k
ak(T ) (∆S u¯T )(p) ,
that is, since ∆Su¯T = u¯T∖S if S ⊆ T and 0 otherwise,
IB,p(f,S) = ∑
T⊇S
∣T ∣⩽k
ak(T ) ∏
i∈T∖S
pi , for ∣S∣ ⩽ k. (19)
Taking k = n in (19), we immediately derive the following expression of
IB,p(f,S) in terms of the Mo¨bius transform of f :
IB,p(f,S) = ∑
T⊇S
a(T ) ∏
i∈T∖S
pi . (20)
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Combining formulas (18) and (20) allows us to express the coefficients
ak(S) explicitly in terms of the Mo¨bius transform of f . We give this ex-
pression in the following proposition, which generalizes (8) and [7, Theorem
7].
Proposition 6. The best kth approximation of f ∶ {0,1}n → R is given by
(7), where
ak(S) = a(S) + (−1)k−∣S∣ ∑
T⊇S
∣T ∣>k
(∣T ∣ − ∣S∣ − 1
k − ∣S∣ )( ∏i∈T∖S pi)a(T ) , for ∣S∣ ⩽ k.
Proof. By combining (18) and (20) and then permuting the sums, we obtain
ak(S) = ∑
T⊇S
( ∏
i∈T∖S
pi)a(T ) ∑
R∶S⊆R⊆T
∣R∣⩽k
(−1)∣R∣−∣S∣,
where the explicit computation of the inner sum was done in [7, p. 20].
It is important to remember that the special case p = 1
2
corresponds to
the non-weighted approximation problem investigated first by Hammer and
Holzman and for which the index IB,p reduces to the Banzhaf interaction
index IB. For this reason, we will call the index IB,p the weighted Banzhaf
interaction index. Its expressions in (14) and (15) provide the following
alternative formulas for the Banzhaf interaction index. The second one was
found in [12, Table 3].
Corollary 7. For every f ∶ {0,1}n → R and every S ⊆ N , we have
IB(f,S) = 1
2n−∣S∣
∑
x∈{0,1}n
f(x)∏
i∈S
(2xi − 1) = 1
2n−∣S∣
∑
T⊆N
(−1)∣S∖T ∣f(T ).
4. Properties and interpretations
Most of the interaction indexes defined for games, including the Banzhaf
interaction index, share a set of fundamental properties such as linearity,
symmetry, and monotonicity (see [9]). Many of them can also be expressed
as expected values of the discrete derivatives (differences) of their arguments
(see for instance (3)). In this section we show that the index IB,p fulfills
many of these properties.
The first result follows from the very definition of the index.
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Proposition 8. For every S ⊆ N , the mapping f ↦ IB,p(f,S) is linear.
We now provide an interpretation of IB,p(f,S) as an expected value of the
S-difference ∆Sf of f . This interpretation is a direct generalization of the one
obtained for the Banzhaf index IB; see formula (3). The proof immediately
follows from Proposition 4 and thus is omitted.
Proposition 9. For every f ∶ {0,1}n → R and every S ⊆ N , we have
IB,p(f,S) = ∑
x∈{0,1}n
w(x)∆Sf(x). (21)
Rewriting (21) as a sum over subsets, we obtain
IB,p(f,S) = ∑
T⊆N
w(T ) (∆Sf)(T ) = E[(∆Sf)(C)], (22)
where C denotes a random coalition. Notice that formula (22) can also be
obtained from (20) by using the random indicator vector X = (X1, . . . ,Xn).
Indeed, we have
IB,p(f,S) = ∑
T⊇S
a(T )E[ ∏
i∈T∖S
Xi] = E[∆Sf(X)].
Remark 3. By combining Propositions 3 and 9, we see that the best kth
approximation of f is the unique multilinear polynomial of degree at most k
that agrees with f in all average S-differences for ∣S∣ ⩽ k.
Since (∆Sf)(T ) = (∆Sf)(T ∖S), we can actually rewrite the sum in (22)
as a sum over the subsets of N ∖ S. We then obtain the following result,
which also generalizes (3).
Theorem 10. For every f ∶ {0,1}n → R and every S ⊆ N , we have
IB,p(f,S) = ∑
T⊆N∖S
pST (∆Sf)(T ), (23)
where pST = Pr(T ⊆ C ⊆ S∪T ) =∏i∈T pi∏i∈(N∖S)∖T (1−pi). Moreover, we have
∑
T⊆N∖S
pST = 1. (24)
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Proof. Partitioning T ⊆ N into K ⊆ N ∖S and L ⊆ S, we can rewrite the sum
in (22) as
IB,p(f,S) = ∑
K⊆N∖S
(∆Sf)(K) ∑
L⊆S
w(K ∪L)
where the inner sum is exactly Pr(K ⊆ C ⊆K ∪ S). Moreover, we have
Pr(K ⊆ C ⊆K ∪ S)
= Pr(Xi = 1 ∀i ∈K and Xi = 0 ∀i ∈ (N ∖ S) ∖K)
= E[∏
i∈K
Xi ∏
i∈(N∖S)∖K
(1 −Xi)] = ∏
i∈K
pi ∏
i∈(N∖S)∖K
(1 − pi),
which proves the first part of the theorem. For the second part, we simply
apply (23) to f = uS to obtain ∑T⊆N∖S pST = IB,p(uS, S) = 1.
Remark 4. When S is a singleton, S = {i}, from (23) we derive the following
explicit expression for the weighted Banzhaf power index
IB,p(f,{i}) = ∑
T⊆N∖{i}
(w(T ) +w(T ∪ {i})) (f(T ∪ {i}) − f(T )).
Interaction indexes of the form (23) with nonnegative coefficients satisfy-
ing property (24) are called probabilistic interaction indexes (see [9]). These
indexes share the following probabilistic interpretation. Suppose that any
coalition S ⊆ N joins a coalition T ⊆ N ∖S at random with (subjective) prob-
ability pST . Then the right-hand side in (23) is simply the expected value of
the marginal interaction (∆Sf)(T ) (called marginal contribution, if ∣S∣ = 1);
see also [12, §2].
In the case of the index IB,p, we have the following additional interpre-
tations of pST as conditional probabilities. The proof is straightforward and
hence omitted.
Proposition 11. For every S ⊆ N and every T ⊆ N ∖ S, the coefficient pST
defined in (23) satisfies
pST = Pr(C = S ∪ T ∣ C ⊇ S) = Pr(C = T ∣ C ⊆ N ∖ S),
where C denotes a random coalition.
In terms of the multilinear extension f¯ of f , we also have the following
interpretation of IB,p, which generalizes the second equalities in (4) and (5).
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Proposition 12. Let F1, . . . , Fn be cumulative distribution functions on [0,1].
Then
IB,p(f,S) = ∫
[0,1]n
(∆S f¯)(x)dF1(x1)⋯dFn(xn) (25)
for every f ∶{0,1}n → R and every S ⊆ N if and only if pi = ∫ 10 xdFi(x) for
every i ∈ N .
Proof. By linearity of the index, Equation (25) holds for every f ∶{0,1}n → R
and every S ⊆ N if and only if it holds for every f = uT , with T ⊆ N , and
every S ⊆ N . Thus this condition is equivalent to
∏
i∈T∖S
pi = ∫
[0,1]n
∏
i∈T∖S
xi dF1(x1)⋯dFn(xn) (26)
for every T ⊆ N and every S ⊆ T . The result then immediately follows since
the right-hand integral in (26) reduces to ∏i∈T∖S ∫ 10 xi dFi(xi).
Remark 5. Clearly, the functions F1, . . . , Fn in Proposition 12 are not uniquely
determined by p. For instance, we could choose the power function Fi(x) =
xpi/(1−pi) or the one-step function Fi(x) = χ[pi,1]. We could as well consider
the beta distribution with parameters pi and 1 − pi.
We now analyze the behavior of the interaction index IB,p on some special
classes of functions. We continue to identify pseudo-Boolean functions on{0,1}n with games on N and vice versa.
Recall that a null player in a game f ∈ GN is a player i ∈ N such that
f(T ∪{i}) = f(T ) for all T ⊆ N ∖{i}. Equivalently, we have ∆{i}f(x) = 0 for
all x ∈ {0,1}n and the variable xi is said to be ineffective for f . In this case,
we have
f(x) = ∑
T⊆N∖{i}
(∆T f)(0) ∏
j∈T
xj = ∑
T⊆N∖{i}
a(T ) ∏
j∈T
xj ,
where 0 = (0, . . . ,0).
Define If = {i ∈ N ∶ xi ineffective for f}; that is, If is the set of null
players in f . From either (21), (22), or (23), we immediately derive the
following result, which states that any coalition containing at least one null
player in f has necessarily a zero interaction.
Proposition 13. For every f ∶{0,1}n → R and every S ⊆ N such that S∩If ≠
∅, we have IB,p(f,S) = 0.
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Recall also that a dummy player in a game f ∈ GN is a player i ∈ N such
that f(T ∪ {i}) = f(T ) + f({i}) − f(∅) for all T ⊆ N ∖ {i}. We say that a
coalition S ⊆ N is dummy in f ∈ GN if f(R ∪ T ) = f(R) + f(T ) − f(∅) for
every R ⊆ S and every T ⊆ N ∖ S. Thus a coalition S and its complement
N ∖ S are simultaneously dummy in any game f ∈ GN .
The following proposition gives an immediate interpretation of this defi-
nition.
Proposition 14. A coalition S ⊆ N is dummy in a game f ∈ GN if and
only if there exist games fS, fN∖S ∈ GN such that IfS ⊇ N ∖ S, IfN∖S ⊇ S and
f = fS + fN∖S.
Proof. For the necessity, just set fS(T ) = f(T ∩S) and fN∖S(T ) = f(T ∖S)−
f(∅). The sufficiency can be checked directly.
Thus Proposition 14 states that a coalition S ⊆ N is dummy in f ∈ GN if
and only if f is of the form
f(x) = ∑
T⊆S
a(T ) ∏
i∈T
xi + ∑
T⊆N∖S
T≠∅
a(T ) ∏
i∈T
xi .
The following result expresses the natural idea that the interaction for
coalitions that are properly partitioned by a dummy coalition must be zero.
It is an immediate consequence of Propositions 8, 13, and 14.
Proposition 15. If a coalition S ⊆ N is dummy in a game f ∈ GN , then
for every coalition K ⊆ N such that K ∩ S ≠ ∅ and K ∖ S ≠ ∅, we have
IB,p(f,K) = 0.
We also have the following result, which immediately follows from Propo-
sition 9.
Proposition 16. If f ∶{0,1}n → R is S-increasing for some S ⊆ N (i.e.,
∆Sf(x) ⩾ 0 for all x ∈ {0,1}n), then IB,p(f,S) ⩾ 0.
We end this section by describing the weighted Banzhaf interaction in-
dexes that are symmetric. An interaction index IB,p is said to be symmetric
(see [13]) if IB,p(pi(f), pi(S)) = IB,p(f,S) for every function f ∶{0,1}n → R,
every subset S ⊆ N , and every permutation pi on N , where pi(f) denotes the
function defined by pi(f)(x1, . . . , xn) = f(xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)).
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Proposition 17. The index IB,p is symmetric if and only if the function w
is symmetric (i.e., p1 = ⋯ = pn).
Proof. If w is symmetric, then the coefficients pST in (23) depend only on p,∣T ∣, and ∣S∣. Therefore the index IB,p is a cardinal-probabilistic index (see
[9]), which is symmetric. Conversely, if IB,p is symmetric, then, by (17), we
have
pi = IB,p(u{i,j},{j}) = IB,p(u{i,j},{i}) = pj
for every i, j ∈ N , i ≠ j, and hence w is also symmetric.
By Proposition 17, we immediately see that the Banzhaf interaction index
IB = IB,1/2 is symmetric. Considering the limiting case p = 0, we also see that
the Mo¨bius transform of f (i.e., a = IB,0) can be regarded as a symmetric
weighted Banzhaf interaction index.
5. Related indexes
In this final section, we establish interesting links between the weighted
Banzhaf interaction index and the Banzhaf and Shapley interaction indexes,
which provide new interpretations of the latter indexes. We also introduce
a normalized version of the weighted Banzhaf index to compare interactions
from different functions (games) and to compute the coefficient of determi-
nation of the best kth approximations.
5.1. Links with the Banzhaf and Shapley indexes
Since the mapping f ↦ IB,p(f, ⋅) is a bijection, we can find conversion
formulas between f , its Mo¨bius transform a, and IB,p(f, ⋅).
The conversion from a to IB,p(f, ⋅) is given in (20). From (18), we imme-
diately obtain the conversion from IB,p(f, ⋅) to a, namely
a(S) = ∑
T⊇S
IB,p(f,T ) ∏
i∈T∖S
(−pi). (27)
By combining (20) and (27), we easily obtain a conversion formula from
IB,p(f, ⋅) to IB,p′(f, ⋅) for every p′ ∈ ]0,1[n, namely
IB,p′(f,S) = ∑
T⊇S
IB,p(f,T ) ∏
i∈T∖S
(p′i − pi) . (28)
16
Now, as already discussed, the index IB can also be expressed in terms
of IB,p simply by setting p = 12 . However, combining (4) with (17), we also
obtain the following alternative expression
IB(f,S) = ∫
[0,1]n
IB,p(f,S)dp. (29)
Equation (29) can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that the players behave
independently of each other to form coalitions, each player i with probabil-
ity pi ∈ ]0,1[, but this probability is not known a priori. Then, to define
an interaction index, it is natural to consider the average (center of mass)
of the weighted indexes over all possibilities of choosing the probabilities.
Equation (29) shows that we then obtain the Banzhaf interaction index.
The Shapley interaction index [12, 13] of a coalition S ⊆ N in a game
f ∈ GN is defined by
ISh(f,S) = ∑
T⊇S
a(T )
∣T ∣ − ∣S∣ + 1 = ∫
1
0
(∆S f¯)(x, . . . , x)dx, (30)
where the set function a∶2N → R is the Mo¨bius transform of f .
Combining (17) with (30), we obtain an interesting expression of ISh in
terms of IB,p, namely
ISh(f,S) = ∫ 1
0
IB,(p,...,p)(f,S)dp. (31)
Here, the players still behave independently of each other to form coali-
tions but with the same probability p. The integral in (31) simply represents
the average value of the weighted indexes over all the possible probabilities.
Remark 6. (a) Formulas (20) and (27) clearly generalize the conversion
formulas between IB and a given in [12, p. 175].
(b) Expressions of power indexes as integrals similar to (30) and (31) were
proposed and investigated by Straffin [23].
(c) Every cardinal-probabilistic index [9] can be expressed as an integral
of IB,(p,...,p) with respect to some distribution function (see [9, Theo-
rem 4.4]).
5.2. Normalized index and coefficients of determination
We have seen that the interaction index IB,p is a linear map. This implies
that it cannot be considered as an absolute interaction index but rather as
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a relative index constructed to assess and compare interactions for a given
function.
If we want to compare interactions for different functions, we need to con-
sider an absolute (normalized) interaction index. Such an index can be de-
fined as follows. Considering again 2N as a probability space with respect to
the measure w, we see that, for a nonempty subset S ⊆ N , the index IB,p(f,S)
is the covariance of the random variables f and vS/∏i∈S √pi(1 − pi). It is
then natural to consider the Pearson correlation coefficient instead of the
covariance.
Definition 18. The normalized interaction index is the mapping
r∶ {f ∶ {0,1}n → R ∶ f is non constant} × (2N ∖ {∅})→ R
defined by
r(f,S) = IB,p(f,S)
σ(f) ∏i∈S
√
pi(1 − pi) = ⟨f −E(f)
σ(f) , vS⟩ ,
where E(f) and σ(f) are the expectation and the standard deviation of f ,
respectively, when f is regarded as a random variable.
From this definition it follows that −1 ⩽ r(f,S) ⩽ 1. Moreover, this index
remains unchanged under interval scale transformations, that is, r(af+b,S) =
r(f,S) for all a > 0 and b ∈ R.
Remark 7. By definition of the normalized interaction index, for every nonempty
S ⊆ N , we have the inequality
∣IB,p(f,S)∣ ⩽ σ(f)∏i∈S√pi(1 − pi) .
The equality holds if and only if there exist a, b ∈ R such that f = avS + b.
The normalized index is also useful to compute the coefficient of determi-
nation R2k(f) = σ2(fk)/σ2(f) of the best kth approximation of f (assuming
f nonconstant). Since E(fk) = IB,p(fk,∅) = IB,p(f,∅) = E(f) (see Proposi-
tion 3), by (11), we obtain
R2k(f) = 1σ2(f) ∥fk −E(fk)∥2
= 1
σ2(f) ∑T⊆N
1⩽∣T ∣⩽k
⟨f, vT ⟩2 = ∑
T⊆N
1⩽∣T ∣⩽k
r(f,T )2.
18
Acknowledgments
This research is supported by the internal research project F1R-MTH-
PUL-09MRDO of the University of Luxembourg.
References
[1] J. M. Alonso-Meijide, B. Casas-Me´ndez, M. J. Holler, and S. Lorenzo-
Freire. Computing power indices: multilinear extensions and new char-
acterizations. European J. Oper. Res., 188(2):540–554, 2008.
[2] J. Banzhaf. Weighted voting doesn’t work : A mathematical analysis.
Rutgers Law Review, 19:317–343, 1965.
[3] A. Charnes, B. Golany, M. Keane, and J. Rousseau. Extremal princi-
ple solutions of games in characteristic function form: core, Chebychev
and Shapley value generalizations. In Econometrics of planning and ef-
ficiency, volume 11 of Adv. Stud. Theoret. Appl. Econometrics, pages
123–133. Kluwer Acad. Publ., Dordrecht, 1988.
[4] I. J. Curiel. A class of nonnormalized power indices for simple games.
Math. Social Sci., 13(2):141–152, 1987.
[5] J. Deegan and E. W. Packel. A new index of power for simple n-person
games. Internat. J. Game Theory, 7(2):113–123, 1978.
[6] G. Ding, R. F. Lax, J. Chen, and P. P. Chen. Formulas for approximating
pseudo-Boolean random variables. Discrete Appl. Math., 156(10):1581–
1597, 2008.
[7] G. Ding, R. F. Lax, J. Chen, P. P. Chen, and B. D. Marx. Transforms of
pseudo-Boolean random variables. Discrete Appl. Math., 158(1):13–24,
2010.
[8] P. Dubey and L. S. Shapley. Mathematical properties of the Banzhaf
power index. Math. Oper. Res., 4:99–131, 1979.
[9] K. Fujimoto, I. Kojadinovic, and J.-L. Marichal. Axiomatic character-
izations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices.
Games Econom. Behav., 55(1):72–99, 2006.
19
[10] M. Grabisch. Alternative representations of discrete fuzzy measures for
decision making. Internat. J. Uncertain. Fuzziness Knowledge-Based
Systems, 5(5):587–607, 1997.
[11] M. Grabisch. k-order additive discrete fuzzy measures and their repre-
sentation. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 92(2):167–189, 1997.
[12] M. Grabisch, J.-L. Marichal, and M. Roubens. Equivalent representa-
tions of set functions. Math. Oper. Res., 25(2):157–178, 2000.
[13] M. Grabisch and M. Roubens. An axiomatic approach to the concept of
interaction among players in cooperative games. Int. J. Game Theory,
28(4):547–565, 1999.
[14] P. Hammer and R. Holzman. Approximations of pseudo-Boolean func-
tions; applications to game theory. Z. Oper. Res., 36(1):3–21, 1992.
[15] P. Hammer and S. Rudeanu. Boolean methods in operations research
and related areas. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag, 1968.
[16] J.-L. Marichal, I. Kojadinovic, and K. Fujimoto. Axiomatic characteri-
zations of generalized values. Discrete Appl. Math., 155(1):26–43, 2007.
[17] T. Murofushi and S. Soneda. Techniques for reading fuzzy measures
(iii): Interaction index (in Japanese). In Proceedings of the 9th Fuzzy
Systems Symposium, Sapporo, Japan, pages 693–696, 1993.
[18] G. Owen. Multilinear extensions of games. Management Sci., 18:P64–
P79, 1972.
[19] G. Owen. Multilinear extensions of games. In: A.E. Roth, editor. The
Shapley Value. Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, pages 139–151.
Cambridge University Press, 1988.
[20] M. Roubens. Interaction between criteria and definition of weights in
MCDA problems. In Proceedings of the 44th Meeting of the European
Working Group ”Multiple Criteria Decision Aiding”, pages 693–696, Oc-
tober 1996.
[21] L. Shapley. A value for n-person games. In Contributions to the The-
ory of Games II (Annals of Mathematics Studies 28), pages 307–317.
Princeton University Press, 1953.
20
[22] L. Shapley and M. Shubik. A method for evaluating the distribution
of power in a committee system. American Political Science Review,
48:787–792, 1954.
[23] P. D. Straffin, Jr. The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as
probabilities. In The Shapley value, pages 71–81. Cambridge Univ. Press,
Cambridge, 1988.
[24] R. J. Weber. Probabilistic values for games. In The Shapley value, pages
101–119. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1988.
21
